Subnet Bridge — wrapped subnet token playground

1 · Network

—

Add the playground to your wallet, then switch to it. It is a local fork — it exists only on this server.

Read this before you switch. The chain ID is 4663, which is the same ID as the real Robinhood Chain. That is deliberate: the controller's EIP-712 domain binds block.chainid, so signatures made here only verify against a contract that believes it is on 4663 — and it means anything built here works unchanged against the real chain later. The cost is that your wallet may well label this “Robinhood Chain” if it already knows that ID. Check the RPC URL, not the network name, to know which chain you are on. Use a throwaway wallet profile.

Network name—

Chain ID—

CurrencyETH (fake)

RPC URL—

2 · Balances

Gas balance — ETH

Token	Your balance	Supply	Backing	Reserve
Connect a wallet to read balances.

All wrappers use 9 decimals, matching TAO's RAO base unit — not 18. “Backing” is the fabricated proof-of-reserve; “Reserve” is whether that attestation is fresh (it goes stale after 6 hours, and minting then reverts until something re-attests).

3 · Wrap

simulated custody

In the real design you would send alpha to a custodian and it would attest to holding it. Here there is no custodian and no alpha: this button is a faucet. The server fabricates a proof-of-reserve, signs it with 2 of 3 fake attester keys, and calls executeMint on the real controller. The contract logic is genuine; the custody is theatre.

Faucet range 0.001–1000 per request, 5 requests per minute. A 0.5% mint fee is taken by the contract, so you receive slightly less than you ask for — that is the real fee arithmetic, not a rounding bug.

4 · Unwrap

your wallet signs

This one is a real transaction from your own account. requestRedemption burns your wrapped tokens and records the liability in pendingRedemption. The custodian cannot do this for you — the token's burnFrom only ever burns msg.sender, which is the correct shape.

The burn is real. The payout is not. Your tokens are genuinely destroyed and the liability is genuinely recorded, but nothing is ever paid out: no alpha moves, no SS58 destination is validated, and no removeStake is called. Clearing the liability takes a second quorum-signed step the operator runs from the CLI.